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Abstract
In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific invest-
ments, I suggest a model where a linear implicit contract can strengthen the incentives to
invest, if the parties are sufficiently patient.  Otherwise, only asset ownership can be used to
influence the incentives.  First, I analyse the case where the implicit contract may include a
fixed transfer, which then must be paid by the manager with the weakest bargaining position.
I argue that this arrangement is not observed in business relations, due to risk aversion,
bounded rationality and social norms.  Therefore I focus on implicit contracts without fixed
transfers in the rest of the paper.  The same ownership structure is then optimal under both
spot governance and implicit contracting, unless an ownership structure with more
symmetrical bargaining positions can support a better implicit contract.  In fact, a first-best
implicit contract is self-enforcing only when the two managers enjoy similar bargaining
positions, even if they are infinitely patient.  Choosing between technologies, strong
interdependencies can be good, since the future losses associated with an implicit contract
violation then are large.
* I thank Terje Lensberg, Frøystein Gjesdal, Trond Olsen, John Roberts and Steve Tadelis for insightful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  A first version of the paper was completed during my stay at Scancor,
Stanford University 1997-98.  I would also like to thank Jim March for his support during that period.
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1. Introduction
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) observed that specific
investments can play an important role to determine optimal asset ownership.  Building on
this idea, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) suggest formal
models to show the benefits and costs of integration with respect to the hold-up problem.
These models are limited to one-period relationships.  I am aware of only two working
papers that treat the multi-period case, where reputation effects can play an important role.1
Halonen (1994) argues that ownership rights matter also in a long-term relationship, where
the parties are disciplined by reputation effects.  In a model where (for some unexplained
reason) no transfer of ownership can take place after one of the parties has cheated, the worst
ownership structure of the one-shot game is good in the repeated setting because it provides
strong punishment but bad because the gains from deviation also are large.  The optimal
ownership structure can change from the one-shot game to the repeated setting.
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1996) analyse the case where only one of the parties invests.
They distinguish between spot employment, firms, spot markets and relational contracts, and
allow for a transfer of ownership rights if cooperation breaks down.  The results add to the
argument by Coase (1937) that firms can arise only when markets perform sufficiently
poorly, as there must be enough surplus from engaging in an implicit contract that the
temptation to renege in one period is offset by the fear of future economic losses.
This paper is an attempt to further deepen our insights with respect to optimal ownership
structures and implicit contracts (which can be interpreted as a kind of trust).  In the spirit of
the Grossman-Hart-Moore models I focus on a situation where both parties make relation-
and asset-specific investments.  Then the model predictions become more realistic, for
instance with respect to when firms should dominate relational contracting.
First, I introduce a general framework for two assets and two managers/owners, where
ownership rights and implicit contracts can govern transactions.  In an accompanying paper
(Bragelien 1998) I discuss how explicit contracts and ownership rights are jointly determined
by the parties’ risk aversion and the specificity of their investments in a one-period setting.
Together these two papers reflect Bradach and Eccles’ (1989) observation that price,
authority and trust mechanisms are found both in markets and in firms.
                                                
1
 Another interesting discussion of reputation effects with respect to the theory of the firm is found in Kreps
(1990).  He considers a situation with one employer (owner) and many (risk averse) employees.  Unforeseen
contingencies render long-term complete contracts impossible.  Instead the employer is given the authority to
decide on adaptations as time goes by and the environment changes.  Then the employees must have some kind
of faith or trust in the fact that the authority will be used fairly.  As unforeseen contingencies tend to follow
patterns, the employer can build up a reputation for meeting the contingencies in a certain way.  Kreps argues
that a corporate culture is partly characterised by the principles that govern such decision making and partly by
the means by which the principles are communicated.
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Then I develop the one-period model.  I assume risk neutrality, linearity, independent
technologies and quadratic cost functions to neutralise all effects except for a simple version
of the hold-up problem found in Hart (1995).  The basic model is a variation of the one I use
in Bragelien (1998) and is inspired by Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) linear moral hazard
model.  It is very different from the models by Halonen and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy,
especially in the way uncertainty and investment specificity is modelled.
In section 4 I introduce an implicit contract that is linear in the observable, but not verifiable
benefits of the two parties.  Following Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1996) I assume that a
spot relationship prevails forever after an implicit contract violation, but that a transfer of
ownership rights can take place.  I focus on self-enforcing implicit contracts, which in fact
are expected never to be broken.
First, in section 5, I analyse the case where the implicit contract may include a fixed transfer.
The manager with the weakest bargaining position would then have to commit to a fixed
payment in every period.  However, in actual business relations, payments typically go the
other way and are part of a verifiable contract.  The absence of fixed transfers in implicit
contracts can be explained by risk aversion, bounded rationality and social norms.
In section 6 I therefore focus on implicit contracts without fixed transfers.  I show that the
manager with the strongest bargaining position will enjoy the strongest incentives under both
spot governance and implicit contracting.  If the managers are sufficiently patient, a self-
enforcing implicit contract always exists that is better than the spot governance relationship.
However, first-best is not always sustainable, even when the discount rate goes to zero.  A
first-best implicit contract can be self-enforcing only if the two managers enjoy relatively
similar bargaining positions.  In other words, with this class of implicit contracts, symmetry
can be good for the implicit contract, and ownership matters even when the parties are
infinitely patient (since the bargaining positions are determined by the ownership structure).
Choosing between ownership structures, an implicit contract benefits from strong bargaining
positions, since the temptation to renege then is small.  Strong bargaining positions are good
also under spot governance.  The managers should therefore choose the same ownership
structure under both governance modes, unless another ownership structure with more
symmetrical bargaining positions can sustain a better implicit contract.  Choosing between
technologies, weak bargaining positions are good for the implicit contract under some
circumstances, since the future losses associated with an implicit contract violation then are
large.  Stronger interdependencies can thus be beneficial for a business relation, even if it
does not lead to higher returns on investments.
In section 7 I suggest some more structure with respect to the investment specificity
technology.  This is helpful to illustrate some well-known results in the spot governance
mode from Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).  Then I use this investment specificity
structure in section 8 to show how the optimal governance structure is jointly determined by
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the discount rate and the relative investment specificity of the two managers in a specific
example.  I do this exercise both for one and two assets.  The example demonstrates, for
example, that partnerships are likely to occur in settings where the two parties have similar
technologies, they take a long-term perspective and there is for all practical purposes only
one asset to own (e.g. the company name).  These conditions seem to be satisfied for many
law and management consulting firms, where partnerships are prevalent.
Finally, in section 9 I discuss the model and some of the results in a wider context.  I argue
that the model seems realistic from a bounded rationality perspective, and that it does capture
mechanisms and trade-offs that are important also under more complex technologies.
2. A general framework
In this section I suggest a general governance framework for two assets and two productive
managers/owners.  Both make unobservable asset- and relationship-specific investments.
When uncertainty is resolved, the two managers make some further non-contractible
decisions (e.g. to trade a particular good) influencing the actual outcome.  It is impossible (or
too costly) to ex-ante contract on the ex-post decision, due to the high degree of uncertainty.
This cycle of ex-ante investments and ex-post decisions and outcomes is repeated in future
periods.
A classical interpretation of the model would be that manager 2 in combination with asset 2
supplies an input to manager 1, who with asset 1 uses this input to produce output that is sold
on the output market (Hart 1995).  The investments may stand for expenditures of money or
time in making the manufacturing operations more effective and developing the output
market respectively.  An asset could for instance be a factory, a distribution network or a
company name, and a manager could include the whole management team.
There are two instruments available to influence the incentives to invest.  The two parties can
choose a specific ownership structure, in the sense that ownership gives the owner(s) residual
control rights (Grossman and Hart 1986).  And, they can agree to an implicit contract on
observable benefits.  The benefits are not verifiable, so a contract cannot be enforced by a
third party, but in a repeated setting reputation effects may discipline the managers.
Reputation effects work only if the managers are sufficiently patient.  Otherwise they must
rely on spot governance, where the parties worry only about the current period when they
make decisions.  If that is the situation, assume that renegotiations always lead to efficient
ex-post decisions, regardless of ex-ante investment levels and ownership structure.  The
negotiated monetary transfer depends on the parties’ bargaining positions.  The ownership
rights will influence these bargaining positions, since the value of a manager’s outside option
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is affected.  A manager’s investment level will thus reflect her marginal benefits after the
anticipated renegotiation process.
Define asset ownership as the right to deny other parties access to the asset (Hart and Moore
1990).  In that case there are five distinct ownership structures.  Either manager 1 owns both
assets (which, following Hart (1995), I call Type 1 integration - T1), manager 2 owns both
assets (Type 2 integration - T2), each manager owns the asset most specific to her
investments (Non-integration - NI), each manager owns the asset most specific to the other
manager’s investments (Cross ownership - CO), or, finally, the two managers jointly own the
two assets (Joint ownership - JO).  Under joint ownership both parties must agree for any of
them to have access to the asset.  In other words, both have a form of veto power.
Then there are altogether ten different categories of governance.  These are summarised in
figure 1 below, where I also name the categories.2
Under spot employment one of the managers owns both assets, and in each period she offers
the other party a contract which is unaffected by the past.  Firms are characterised by the
same ownership structure, but the parties are to some extent disciplined by reputation effects.
Under non-integration I call the categories spot market and relational contracting.  While
cross ownership and joint ownership structures in the implicit contracting mode are called
mutual hostage taking and partnerships respectively.
As the reader will see when I define the formal model, joint ownership and cross ownership
are dominated by non-integration in the spot governance mode, and these categories are
therefore crossed out.  However, joint ownership and cross ownership can be viable in an
implicit contract mode.
                                                
2
 The figure is inspired by the framework for one asset and one-sided investments found in Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (1996).  Note that the categories I call Spot Employment II and Firm II are comparable to the
categories they choose to call Spot Market and Relational Contract respectively.
Figure 1
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Non-integration and cross ownership are not relevant if there is only one asset.  If there are
more than two assets, more ownership structures will be available to the parties.  In this
model, ownership is only important in the sense that it decides the parties’ relative bargaining
positions.  The more assets there are (that are specific to investments), the more flexibility
the parties have in finding jointly favourable bargaining positions.
3. The basic one-period model
There are two assets and two productive risk-neutral parties, manager 1 and manager 2.  At
t = 0 the parties make non-observable investments in human capital (e1 and e2).
The benefits at t = 1 for the two managers are observable to manager 1 and 2 but not
verifiable to a third party.3  The benefits depend on the investments at t = 0, some stochastic
variables and on whether the two parties choose to cooperate or not at t = 1.  In the case of no
cooperation, the benefits will further depend on the ownership structure.  The outside option
is worth more to a manager if she has access to some of (or preferably all) the assets.
Whether cooperation has taken place or not is also observable to the two parties but not
verifiable to outsiders.
Assume independent technologies that are linear in an agent’s effort ej (j∈{1,2}).  If they
choose to cooperate, the two managers' value added (net of t = 1 costs) are given by
θ1C = e1 + ε1
θ2C = e2 + ε2
where ej ≥ 0, E[εj] = 0 and εj ∈ [-ε, ε].4  In the more general case, θjC could be a function of
both e1 and e2.  However, the independent technology property is not necessarily unrealistic.
Say that manager 2's manufacturing costs decide θ2C (after investing in production
competencies), and that the price manager 1 can take for the product in the end market
decides θ1C (after marketing investments).  There is no reason to believe that marketing
investments should influence production costs and that (firm-specific) production technology
investments (that are unobservable to the buyers) should influence the price in the output
market.  Note that I do not rule out correlation between ε1 and ε2.
If, however, the two parties choose not to cooperate, their benefits are reduced to
                                                
3
 Note that benefits (and costs) can be monetary in nature even if they are not verifiable to third parties.
4
 The assumption that investment levels and the stochastic variables enter the benefit functions additively is
inspired by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).  Alternatively we could let the range of εj depend on ej, for
instance so that εj ∈ [-ej, ej].  The results of this paper would still hold qualitatively, and in fact the self-
sustaining constraints (in section 4) would then be simplified.
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θ1NC ≡ γk θ1C
θ2NC ≡ λk θ2C
where γk, λk ∈ [0,1) are constants that depend on the ownership structure k ∈ K ≡ {T1, T2,
NI, CO, JO}.  This assumption is strong in the sense that total and marginal benefits move
together.  That does not necessarily need to be the case, but it is consistent with Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).5  Further, the assumption is strong in the sense that the nature
of the uncertain variables is the same both under cooperation and non-cooperation.
As is becoming standard in the literature, assume a symmetric Nash bargaining solution at
t = 1.  That is, cooperation takes place after renegotiations, and the gains are split 50:50.  The
risk neutral managers then maximise
U1 = ½ E [ θ1C + θ1NC + θ2C - θ2NC ] - c1(e1)
U2 = ½ E [ θ1C - θ1NC + θ2C + θ2NC] - c2(e2)
where cj(ej) denotes manager j's private costs at t = 0 (in t = 1 dollars).  To simplify the
analysis, assume quadratic cost functions
cj (ej) =  ½ ej2 ,   j∈{1, 2}.6
Define ϕk ≡ ½(1+γk) and ψk ≡ ½(1+λk), which can be interpreted as the parties' respective
bargaining positions (which must not be confused with the parties' bargaining power in a
Nash bargaining sense).  The maximisation problems of the two managers for a given owner-
ship structure k then simplify to
e1
k
  =  
  
Argmax
e1
U1  =  
  
Argmax
e1
{ ϕk e1 + (1-ψk) e2 - ½ e12 }  =  ϕk
e2
k
  =  
  
Argmax
e2
U2  =  
  
Argmax
e2
{ (1-ϕk) e1 + ψk e2 - ½ e22 }  =  ψk
Note that first-best investment levels are e1* = e2* = 1, so the managers always underinvest
in the spot governance mode.  They should choose the ownership structure (determining
specific values of ϕk and ψk) that maximises the expected joint surplus
Ωk (ϕk,ψk) = e1(ϕk) + e2(ψk) - c1(e1(ϕk)) - c2(e2(ψk))
= ϕk + ψk - ½ ϕk2 - ½ ψk2
                                                
5
 Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1996) assume a different kind of technology, where total and marginal benefits
do not move together.  Hence, in their model over-investment is possible, while in my model the parties always
underinvest in the spot governance mode (although one of the managers may over-invest under an implicit
contract).
6
 Most of the results in this paper are robust with respect to the form of the cost function.  A notable exception
is proposition 6.8 (that stronger interdependencies can be good), which is not true if investments are very elastic
(with respect to the investment specificity parameters).
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where e1(ϕk) and e2(ψk) denote the optimal investments of the two managers, for a given
investment specificity.
Although not necessary to generate the main results of the paper, it can be helpful to assume
a ranking of the ownership structures that I discussed in section 2, in the sense that
1 > γT1 ≥ γNI ≥ γCO ≥ γT2 = γJO ≥ 0
1 > λT2 ≥ λNI ≥ λCO ≥ λT1 = λJO ≥ 0
Then, it follows directly from the definitions of ϕ and ψ that
1 > ϕT1 ≥ ϕNI ≥ ϕCO ≥ ϕT2 = ϕJO ≥  ½
1 > ψT2 ≥ ψNI ≥ ψCO ≥ ψT1 = ψJO  ≥  ½
With these assumptions, the value of the outside option increases (weakly) with the number
of assets the manager controls.  Consider the set of inequalities for manager 1.  By definition,
there is a special link between manager 1 and asset 1, and the outside value is therefore
assumed higher for the manager if she owns her asset instead of the other one (i.e.
γNI ≥ γCO).  Type 2 integration and joint ownership are equivalent with respect to the outside
option for manager 1, since manager 2 has the right to exclude her from both assets under
both ownership structures.
The expected joint surplus increases in ϕ and ψ for the relevant range of these parameters.
Joint ownership and cross ownership are therefore (weakly) dominated by non-integration in
the spot governance mode (since ϕNI ≥ ϕCO ≥ ϕJO and ψNI ≥ ψCO ≥ ψJO).
4. A linear implicit contract
An implicit contract is based on the realisations of the observable, but non-verifiable benefits
of the two parties (θ1C and θ2C).  Assume that the implicit contract is restricted to be linear,
in the form of a vector (a, b, t), where a is 1's share of θ1C, b is 2's share of θ2C and t is a fixed
transfer, which is positive when manager 1 is on the receiving end.  Linear contracts are
attractive from a bounded rationality perspective and to avoid strategic behaviour over time
(during a period).7
After the uncertainty is resolved in a period, the two parties can write a verifiable contract on
specific amounts, so there is no risk of one of the parties honouring the implicit contract ex-
post while the other does not.  Either the implicit contract is fulfilled in its entirety, or, if a
party chooses to renege, the parties' bargaining positions decide the distribution of the
surplus for that period (as in the spot governance mode).
                                                
7
 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) argue convincingly for linear explicit incentive contracts.
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Further assume that both parties and the assets live forever (or die together at a random date).
There is a common positive discount rate, r, which is constant over all periods.  In other
words, the parties are equally patient with respect to when they would like their benefits.
The implicit contract is continued as long as both parties respect it.  But if one party chooses
to renege on the contract, all trust is destroyed, and the parties will be unable to agree upon
any new implicit contract afterwards.8
There are three major scenarios with respect to the future relations of the two parties when an
implicit contract is broken.  The most extreme would be that they become so angry with each
other that no transaction is possible whatsoever.  Or, they could agree to deal with each other
in a spot governance mode without being allowed to change the ownership structure, even if
another structure would yield a higher expected joint surplus (as in Halonen 1994).  Finally,
they could transfer the ownership rights (if that is desirable), and then settle in a spot
governance mode under the best possible ownership structure for that mode (as in Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy 1996).
Theoretically, the second scenario is odd, because the ownership structure under the implicit
contract also decides the joint surplus after the implicit contract is broken.  In other words,
the parties could agree upon a very disadvantageous ownership structure to increase the
expected punishment associated with reneging on the contract.
In my opinion, the third scenario is more consistent with the basic assumptions.  If the parties
could have agreed upon a renegotiation solution under spot governance in the first place,
then it is difficult to understand why they cannot agree upon an ownership transfer and a
future spot relationship after an implicit contract is broken.  The ownership transfer does
only require that they agree upon a fixed payment, which is verifiable and can be enforced by
a court.  And the spot governance mode as such does not require any trust at all, so the fact
that there has been an implicit contract in place should not stop the parties from entering a
spot relationship afterwards (at least in a world without heated emotions).9
Assume therefore that an ownership transfer is possible after one of the parties reneges on
the implicit contract.  Index the best ownership structure under an implicit contract i ∈ K,
and the best ownership structure under spot governance s ∈ K.  Using the expression for the
expected joint surplus from section 3, the discounted value added (∆) from the transfer of
ownership rights is given by
∆  =  1/r [ { ϕs  - ½ ϕs2 + ψs  - ½ ψs2 } - { ϕi - ½ ϕi2 + ψi - ½ ψi2 } ]
                                                
8
 Later I will focus on self-enforcing implicit contracts, where the probability of an implicit contract violation
actually occurring is zero.
9
 Note that under spot governance, if the transaction involves a transfer of a good ex-post, the parties must be
able to write a verifiable contract at this point of time on the transfer of the good.  Then the uncertainty is
already resolved (for that period) and the parties can describe in detail the characteristics of the good and the
fixed payment for the transfer.  (While the uncertainty ex-ante makes contingent contracts too costly to write.)
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By definition ∆ ≥ 0.  Assume a 50:50 split of the value added from such a transfer.
Note that although we allow a transfer of ownership rights after an implicit contract
violation, it turns out that it usually will be optimal to base the implicit contract on the same
ownership structure as under spot governance anyway (so that ∆ = 0).  The case where the
parties indeed do expect a transfer of ownership rights is important for the choice of
ownership structure, while the case where they do not expect such a transfer is relevant for
the initial choice of technology
For an implicit contract to hold, it must be incentive compatible for the two managers both
ex-ante and ex-post in every period.  Ex-ante, a manager can follow three strategies.
First, she can plan to keep the implicit contract forever.  Given that the other manager
follows the same strategy, the managers’ effort levels are then
e1  =  
  
Argmax
e1
{ a
 
e1 + (1-b) e2 + t - ½ e12 }  =  a
e2  =  
  
Argmax
e2
{ (1-a)
 
e1 + b e2 - t - ½ e22 }  =  b
Second, she can ex-ante choose to not accept the implicit contract and communicate this to
the other manager.  Then a transfer of assets will occur immediately (if that is optimal), and
there will be a spot relationship from period one.  For the two managers to instead prefer the
implicit contract (and follow the first strategy), the following inequalities must be satisfied
(1a) 1/r { ½ a2 + b(1-b) + t }  ≥  1/r { ½ ϕi 2 + ψi (1-ψi) } + ½ ∆
(1b) 1/r { ½ b2 + a(1-a) - t }  ≥  1/r { ½ ψi 2 + ϕi (1-ϕi) } + ½ ∆
Third, the manager can pretend that she accepts the implicit contract but plan to renege on it.
Say that manager 1 follows this strategy while manager 2 invests according to the implicit
contract.  Manager 1 then invests ϕ, which will also be her share of her own (reduced) value
added.  On the other hand, she expects to end up with a higher share of manager 2's value
added.  In future periods the spot governance mode prevails.  The following inequalities
must thus hold for the two managers to prefer to be honest (and follow the first strategy)
(2a) (1 + 1/r ){ ½ a2 + b(1-b) + t }  ≥   ½ ϕi2 + b(1-ψi) + 1/r { ½ ϕi 2 + ψi (1-ψi) } + ½ ∆
(2b) (1 + 1/r ){ ½ b2 + a(1-a) - t }  ≥   ½ ψi2 + a(1-ϕi) + 1/r { ½ ψi 2 + ϕi (1-ϕi) } + ½ ∆
Ex-post, after the uncertainty for that period is resolved, a manager may be tempted to renege
on the implicit contract, if the value added of the other manager is unexpectedly high while
her own value added is low.  Then the spot bargaining solution (ϕ, ψ) can be better for her in
that particular period than the implicit contract (a, b).  On the other hand, if she reneges, a
spot relationship prevails forever after which (in expectancy) implies lower future benefits,
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as given by (1a) and (1b).  So for both managers to honour the contract ex-post, the
following two inequalities must hold in any given period
(3a) a(e1(a) + ε1) + (1-b)(e2(b) + ε2) + t + 1/r [ ae1(a) + (1-b)e2(b) + t - c1(e1(a)) ]
≥ ϕi(e1(a) +ε1) + (1-ψi)(e2(b) + ε2) + 1/r [ ϕie1(ϕi) + (1-ψi)e2(ψi) - c1(e1(ϕi)) ] + ½ ∆
(3b) (1-a)(e1(a) + ε1) + b(e2(b) + ε2) - t + 1/r [ (1-a)e1(a) + be2(b) - t - c2(e2(b)) ]
≥ (1-ϕi)(e1(a) + ε1) + ψi(e2(b) + ε2) + 1/r [ (1-ϕi)e1(ϕi) + ψie2(ψi) - c2(e2(ψi)) ] + ½ ∆
DEFINITION 4.1:  An implicit contract is self-enforcing if (3a) and (3b) hold for all possible
realisations of the uncertain variables ε1 and ε2.10
Later I will show that a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi in all optimal implicit contracts.  For now, just
assume that this is true.  Remember that εj ∈ [-ε, ε].  For an implicit contract to be self-
enforcing, (3a) must hold for (ε1, ε2) = (-ε, ε) and (3b) must hold for (ε1, ε2) = (ε, -ε).  (3a)
and (3b) are then satisfied for all possible combinations of ε1 and ε2.  Note that we do not
have to decide the particular probability distributions of ε1 and ε2.
We know that (e1, e2) = (ϕi, ψi) under spot governance and (e1, e2) = (a, b) if the implicit
contract is expected to hold.  When a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi, the self-enforcing constraints can thus
be written as
(4a) (b-ψi)(b+ε) - (a-ϕi)(a-ε) - t  ≤  1/r [ ½ a2 + b(1-b) + t - ½ ϕi2 - ψi(1-ψi) ] - ½ ∆
(4b) (a-ϕi)(a+ε) - (b-ψi)(b-ε) + t  ≤  1/r [½ b2 + a(1-a) - t - ½ ψi2 - ϕi(1-ϕi) ] - ½ ∆
In other words, the gains from reneging in that particular period (that are given on the left-
hand sides of the inequalities) must be offset by the expected future losses (that are given on
the right hand sides).  Observe that the constraints are strengthened (for the same values of ϕi
and ψi) if a transfer of ownership rights is expected after an implicit contract is broken
(i.e. ∆ > 0), compared to the case where no such transfer is expected (i.e. ∆ = 0), since the
punishment is reduced.
It is straightforward to show that (4a) and (4b) are stronger than the ex-ante constraints (1a),
(1b), (2a) and (2b) if
(5) 


ψϕ
ψϕ
ψϕ
ψ
ψϕ
ϕ
≥ε  
-b+-a
t-)-b(b-)-a(a
  ,  )-b+-2(a
)-(b
  ,  )-b+-2(a
)-(a
 Max     
ii
ii
ii
2
i
ii
2
i
All the major results of this paper are valid, irrespective of whether it is the ex-ante or the ex-
post constraints that are binding (although a couple of the propositions must be slightly
                                                
10
 Self-enforcement is a strong condition (which is also used by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1996).  In a more
realistic version of the model, the parties could be willing to engage in an implicit contract that is broken in a
given period with some positive probability.  However, this extension does not seem to add significant insights.
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rephrased).  It turns out to be more convenient to work with the ex-post constraints.
Therefore assume that ε is large enough so that (5) is satisfied.  Then the ex-ante constraints
can be ignored.  Note that the right hand side of (5) typically is quite small compared to
investment levels, so there is not much uncertainty that is needed for it to hold.
An optimal self-enforcing implicit contract then solves
)t,b,a(
Max  { a - ½ a2 + b - ½ b2 }, subject to (4a) and (4b).
Define I ≡ 3/2(ϕi2 - ψi2) - (ϕi - ψi).  Note that ϕi < ψi ⇔ I < 0 for ϕi, ψi ∈ [½, 1).  I can be
interpreted as a measure of manager 1's bargaining position relative to manager 2, given the
ownership structure under the implicit contract.  Remember from section 3 that the expected
joint surplus in the spot governance mode is given by Ωs ≡ ϕs + ψs  - ½ (ϕs2 + ψs2).  Setting in
for ∆, (4a) and (4b) can then be reformulated as
(6a) (b-ψi)(b+ε) - (a-ϕi)(a-ε) - t  ≤  1/r [½ a2 + b(1-b) + t - ½ I - ½ Ωs ]
(6b) (a-ϕi)(a+ε) - (b-ψi)(b-ε) + t ≤  1/r [½ b2 + a(1-a) - t + ½ I - ½ Ωs ]
where Ωs = Ωi if no transfer of ownership rights is expected after an implicit contract
violation.
The Lagrangian for the optimal self-enforcing implicit contract is given by
(7) L(a, b, t, λ1, λ2) = a - ½ a2 + b - ½ b2
- λ1 { (b-ψi)(b+ε) - (a-ϕi)(a-ε) - t - 1/r [ ½ a2 + b(1-b) + t - ½ I - ½ Ωs ] }
- λ2 { (a-ϕi)(a+ε) - (b-ψi)(b-ε) + t - 1/r [ ½ b2 + a(1-a) - t + ½ I - ½ Ωs ] }
where λ1 and λ2 denote the Lagrange multipliers for (6a) and (6b) respectively.   Remember
that this expression is valid only when a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi.
5. The optimal implicit contract with a fixed transfer
The implicit contract defined in the previous section could include a fixed transfer (as in
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1996).  I will later argue that such transfers are not observed in
business relations due to risk aversion, bounded rationality and social norms.  However, from
a theoretical point of view, it is interesting to study how such implicit contracts would have
performed.
In section 4 I assumed that incentives are stronger under the implicit contract for both
managers.  Now I need to show that this result in fact does hold.
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PROPOSITION 5.1:  An optimal implicit contract (with a fixed transfer) provides (weakly)
stronger incentives for both the two managers compared to the spot governance mode under
the same ownership structure (i.e. a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi).
PROOF:  Proof by contradiction.  Say that a < ϕi.  Then b > ψi, since the implicit contract
otherwise is worse than the spot governance mode.  For the implicit contract to be self-
enforcing, (3a) must hold for (ε1, ε2) = (ε, ε) and (3b) must hold for (ε1, ε2) = (-ε, -ε).  The
Lagrangian for the optimal implicit contract is then given by
L(a, b, t, λ1, λ2) = a - ½ a2 + b - ½ b2
- λ1 { (b-ψi)(b+ε) + (ϕi-a)(a+ε) - t - 1/r [ ½ a2 + b(1-b) + t - ½ I - ½ Ωs ] }
- λ2 { -(ϕi-a)(a-ε) - (b-ψi)(b-ε) + t - 1/r [ ½ b2 + a(1-a) - t + ½ I - ½ Ωs ] }
where λ1 and λ2 denote the Lagrange multipliers for the two self-enforcement constraints.
The first-order condition with respect to t implies that λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ for the optimal contract.
Then ∂L / ∂a = 1-a + λ{2ε + 1/r(1-a)}, which is positive for a < ϕi (< 1).  In other words, in
the optimal contract a should be set at least equal to ϕi.  But this result contradicts the
assumption that a < ϕi, which thus cannot hold.  Similar for b < ψi.  QED.
We can therefore use (7) from the previous section to find the optimal implicit contract.  But
we must check that the solution does satisfy the requirement that a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi.  As in the
proof of proposition 5.1, the first-order condition with respect to t implies that
λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ.  The fixed transfer t is used to make the 'marginal costs' of each constraint the
same.  (6a) and (6b) can therefore be combined to one constraint
(8) 2ε (a + b - ϕi - ψi) ≤ 1/r (a - ½a2 + b - ½b2 - Ωs)
If this constraint is satisfied, some t always exists, so that both (6a) and (6b) hold.
First, consider the situation where a > ϕi and b > ψi.  The first-order conditions with respect
to a and b then imply that the managers will enjoy equal incentives, even if they have very
different bargaining positions (i.e. a = b ≡ α).  Equal incentives are good, since the managers
have identical convex cost functions.  The solution to the optimisation problem is given by
(9) ( )sii2 )(r2r)2-(1r2-1 ,1Min Ω−ψ+ϕε+ε+ε=α
Before we go on, consider under what circumstances first-best is sustainable.
PROPOSITION 5.2:  A first-best implicit contract is always sustainable if the two parties are
sufficiently patient (i.e. the discount rate is sufficiently low), when the implicit contract can
include a fixed transfer.
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PROOF:  From (8) we see that first-best can be sustained when 2ε(2 - ϕi - ψi) ≤ 1/r(1 - Ωs),
which is always satisfied for r → 0, since Ωs < 1 for all ϕs, ψs ∈ [½, 1).  QED.
Second, assume that α < Max(ϕi, ψi).  Say for instance that ψi < ϕi, so that ψi < α < ϕi.  From
the proof of proposition 5.1 we then know that a* = ϕi.  Set this value of a into the constraint
(8), and solve for the optimal value of b
(10) si2ii2 2r42r)2-(1r2-1 b Ω−ψε+ϕ−ϕ+ε+ε=
Similarly, consider the case where ϕi < ψi, so that b = ψi.  Then the optimal a is given by
(11) si2ii2 2r42r)2-(1r2-1 a Ω−ϕε+ψ−ψ+ε+ε=
The incentives under the optimal implicit contract are thus given by
ii
ii
ii
i
,i
),(Max
   if   
   if   
   if   
),a(
)b(
),(
*)b*,a(
ψ<α<ϕ
ϕ<α<ψ
α≤ψϕ



ψ
ϕ
αα
=
where b and a ,α  are defined in (9), (10) and (11).  Now consider the fixed transfer of the
contract.
PROPOSITION 5.3:  The manager with the best bargaining position will receive the fixed
transfer, if such a transfer is part of the optimal implicit contract (i.e. ϕi > ψi ⇒ t ≥ 0 and
ϕi < ψi ⇒ t ≤ 0).
PROOF:  First, assume that (a*, b*) = ( α , α ), and that (6a) and (6b) bind.  Subtract each side
of (6b) from the respective side of (6a) to find t
t  =  
r1
r)(I ii21
+
αψ−ϕ+
Since ϕi > ψi ⇔ I > 0, it follows directly that t must be positive if ϕi > ψi, and vice versa.  If
the constraints are not binding, then a non-zero t is not needed in the implicit contract.
Second, consider the situation where ψi < α < ϕi.  Then (6a) and (6b) with (a*,b*) = (ϕi, b )
imply that
t  =  
r1
))b(br)(b( 21i43i
+
−ψ++ψ−
which also must be positive, since b  > ψi ≥ ½.  Similarly, ϕi < α < ψi implies that t < 0.
QED.
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An implicit contract with fixed transfers does not seem very realistic, since it is always the
party with the worst bargaining position that must commit to a recurring fixed payment.
Such transfers are usually not observed in business transactions.  Risk considerations and
wealth constraints are probably important reasons, since the weakest party can have
difficulties paying in periods where profits are low due to uncertain (external) factors.  It can
also conflict with the parties’ social norms (with respect to equity), if it is not considered fair
to take advantage of another party’s high investment specificity to secure a fixed payment in
addition to a large share (up to 100 percent) of own value added.  Finally, the managers may
have difficulties understanding the role fixed payments could play in implicit contracts,
while it is straightforward that a higher share of own value added strengthens the incentives
to invest.
Instead managers and owners tend to focus on the respective shares of the value added that
the different units are entitled to.  In the next section I will therefore study a version of the
model where a fixed transfers is not allowed as part of the implicit contract.  Note that I do
not claim that fixed transfers are not important in business relations.  But, I would argue that
when there is such a recurring payment, it is usually part of a verifiable contract, and it is
paid to the weaker party as part of a risk sharing arrangement.
6. The optimal implicit contract without a fixed transfer
As I discussed above, a model where the implicit contract does not include a fixed transfer
does seem to better conform to actual business practice.  Assume, therefore, that t must be
set equal to zero.  It is then not possible to derive a simple closed-form solution to the
optimisation problem that was given by the Lagrangian (7) in section 4.  We must instead
show the results in a somewhat more indirect way.
It turns out that the ex-ante constraints (1a) and (1b), where t = 0, now are useful to prove
that incentives are stronger for both the managers under the implicit contract.
PROPOSITION 6.1:  A viable implicit contract (without a fixed transfer) provides stronger
incentives for both the two managers compared to the spot governance mode under the same
asset ownership structure (i.e. a > ϕi and b > ψi).
PROOF:  (1a) and (1b) must also hold for ∆ = 0 (since ∆ ≥ 0).  Set ∆ = 0, multiply each
inequality with r (which is positive) and reformulate to get
(12a) ½(a - ϕi)(a + ϕi) - (b - ψi)(b + ψi - 1)  ≥  0
(12b) ½(b - ψi)(b + ψi) - (a - ϕi)(a + ϕi - 1)  ≥  0
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First, note that at least one of the inequalities a > ϕi and b > ψi must hold for an implicit
contract to yield a higher joint surplus than the spot governance mode.  Suppose a > ϕi.  The
second term of  (12b) is then negative (since ϕi ≥ ½).  For the inequality to hold, the first
term must therefore be positive.  That is, a > ϕi ⇒ b > ψi.  Similarly, a > ϕi must hold for
(12a) to be satisfied if b > ψi.  QED.
In other words, we can again use the optimisation problem as it is stated in (7), but we do not
need to check for a ≥ ϕi and b ≥ ψi anymore, since the optimal contract always will satisfy
those conditions.  From constraints (6a) and (6b) we can calculate the maximum discount
rate for a given implicit contract to be feasible (when t = 0).
r  ≤  [ ½ a2 + b(1-b) - ½ I - ½ Ωs ] / [ (b-ψi)(b+ε) - (a-ϕi)(a-ε) ]  ≡  f(a, b, ϕi, ψi, Ωs)
r  ≤  [ ½ b2 + a(1-a) + ½ I - ½ Ωs ] / [ (a-ϕi)(a+ε) - (b-ψi)(b-ε) ]  ≡  g(a, b, ϕi, ψi, Ωs)
That is, r ≤ Min{f(⋅), g(⋅)}.  It can be shown that for a viable implicit contract, fa, gb > 0 and
fb, ga < 0.11
PROPOSITION 6.2:  The manager with the strongest bargaining position will also (weakly)
have the strongest incentives to invest under the optimal implicit contract (i.e. ϕi > ψi ⇒
a ≥ b and ϕi < ψi ⇒ a ≤ b).
PROOF:  Suppose ϕi > ψi.  If a = b, then g(⋅) > f(⋅) ≥ r  for a viable implicit contract.  Since
fa > 0 and ga < 0, the coefficient a can be increased until g(⋅) = f(⋅).  That will be a better
implicit contract, since manager 1's incentives are strengthened, unless a and b already take
the first-best values.  a < b will never be optimal, since g(⋅) > f(⋅) then too.  (To reach an
optimal implicit contract, both a and b should be increased, but a must be increased more
than b.)  Similar for ϕi < ψi.  QED.
COROLLARY:  Managers with equal bargaining positions will enjoy the same incentive
strength under an implicit contract (i.e. ϕi = ψi ⇒ a = b).
PROOF:  From the proof of proposition 6.2 it is clear that ϕi ≥ ψi ⇒ a ≥ b and ϕi ≤ ψi ⇒
a ≤ b. a = b must therefore hold for ϕi = ψi.  QED.
Note that proposition 6.2 and its corollary are true only when the production technologies of
the two managers are symmetrical in nature.  That is, the benefit and cost functions must be
identical, and the ranges of the two error terms must be the same.
PROPOSITION 6.3:  For sufficiently low discount rate r (i.e. the parties are sufficiently patient),
a self-enforcing implicit contract always exists that is better than the optimal spot governance
relationship.
                                                
11
 To show the sign of these derivatives, remember that a > ϕi ≥ ½, b > ψi ≥ ½ and f(⋅), g(⋅) > 0.
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PROOF:  Suppose that the parties choose the best ownership structure for the spot governance
mode as a basis for the implicit contract, so that ∆ = 0.  In this setting, we must show that for
any combination (ϕi, ψi), where ϕi, ψi ∈ [½, 1), there always exists a pair (a, b), where
a ∈ (ϕi, 1] and b ∈ (ψi, 1], so that the right hand sides of (4a) and (4b) both are positive,
when t = 0.  Then the inequalities will hold if r is sufficiently low.
The following two inequalities are sufficient conditions for the right hand sides of (4a) and
(4b) to be positive when ∆ = 0
a  >  )b1(b2)1(2 ii2i −−ψ−ψ+ϕ   ≡  h(b)
a  <  ½ + ½ )1(42b21 ii2i2 ϕ−ϕ−ψ−+   ≡  k(b)
b → ψi ⇒ h(b), k(b) → ϕi and k'(b) > h'(b) > 0.  Then some b > ψi must exist, so that there is
a non-empty range (h(b), k(b)) from which a > ϕi can be chosen to satisfy both these
conditions.   QED.
In a first-best implicit contract (a, b) = (1, 1).  The self-enforcing constraints can then be
written as
r  ≤  ½  )1)(1(  )1)(1(
  I  1
ii
s
ε−ϕ−−ε+ψ−
Ω−−
  ≡  fFB(ϕi, ψi, Ωs)
r  ≤  ½ )1)(1(  )1)(1(
  I  1
ii
s
ε−ψ−−ε+ϕ−
Ω−+
  ≡  gFB(ϕi, ψi, Ωs)
Since ϕi < ψi ⇔ fFB(⋅) > gFB(⋅) for ϕi, ψi ∈ [½, 1), it is only the self-enforcing constraint for
the manager with the strongest bargaining position that is relevant for a first-best implicit
contract.
PROPOSITION 6.4:  First-best is not always sustainable, even if the discount rate goes to zero,
when the implicit contract cannot include a fixed transfer.
PROOF:  Let r → 0.  (4a) and (4b) are then reduced to the ex-ante constraints (1a) and (1b).
With t = 0, ∆ = 0 and a = b = 1, these constraints imply that
½ + ½ 12 2i −ψ   ≤  ϕi  ≤  )1(21 ii ψ−ψ−    for  ψi > ½ .
For ψi ≤ ½ , only the second inequality is relevant.  Note that the values ϕi can take always
include ψi.  Say that ψi = 0.75.  Then 0.677 ≤ ϕi ≤ 0.791 must hold for a first-best implicit
contract to be sustainable.  The constraints will be even stricter for ∆ > 0.  If ϕi has a value
outside the critical range, first-best is not sustainable.  QED.
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The proof of proposition 6.4 indicates that for a first-best implicit contract to be self-
enforcing, the two managers must enjoy relatively similar bargaining positions.  The next
proposition shows that equal bargaining positions are good to sustain first-best, since
deviations from such symmetry always will increase one of the parties’ temptation to renege
on the implicit contract.
PROPOSITION 6.5:  Suppose that an ownership structure can be chosen where the managers
have equal bargaining positions (ϕ = ψ), and that the managers are just sufficiently patient
for first-best to be sustained with an implicit contract (without fixed transfer) for that
ownership structure.  That is, r = fFB(⋅) = gFB(⋅).  A one-sided change in bargaining positions
would then require the parties to be more patient for the first-best implicit contract to still be
self-enforcing (since fFB(⋅) or gFB(⋅) must decrease).
PROOF:  Say that ϕi = ψi.  Then fFB(⋅) = gFB(⋅).  It is straightforward to verify that fϕFB,
gψ
FB
 < 0 and fψ
FB
, gϕ
FB
 > 0, both when a transfer of ownership rights is expected after an
implicit contract is broken and when it is not expected (as long as fFB(⋅), gFB(⋅) > 0).  A one-
sided increase or decrease in ϕi or ψi must therefore reduce either fFB(⋅) or gFB(⋅).  QED.
The basic results that were stated in propositions 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 are valid regardless of
whether the implicit contract can include a fixed transfer or not.  That is not true for
propositions 6.4 and 6.5.  As proposition 5.2 indicated, symmetry is not important for first-
best implicit contracts with a fixed transfer.  But, without such a transfer, the implicit
contract is no longer as effective.  It is then more difficult to provide the managers with equal
incentives (which is good because the managers have equal convex cost functions).  That
means that the choice of ownership structure becomes more important.  Ownership structures
with symmetrical bargaining positions are good, because it is then easier to achieve similar
incentive strengths for the two managers.
a) The choice of ownership structure
Now consider the choice of ownership structure in some more detail.  Assume that
technology is given, so that the only way the managers can influence their respective
bargaining positions is through their common choice of ownership structure.
To investigate whether it in general is optimal to choose an ownership structure different
from the one that is optimal under spot governance, consider the optimisation problem given
in (7) when a transfer of ownership rights is expected to take place after an implicit contract
violation (∆ > 0).  Due to the envelope theorem, ∂L/∂ϕi and ∂L/∂ψi express the change in the
maximum joint surplus for a one-sided strengthening of manager 1’s and manager 2’s
bargaining positions respectively.
(13a) ∂L / ∂ϕi = - λ1 { a - ε + ½ (3ϕi-1) / r } + λ2 { a + ε + ½ (3ϕi-1) / r }
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(13b) ∂L / ∂ψi = λ1 { b + ε + ½ (3ψi-1) / r } - λ2 { b - ε + ½ (3ψi-1) / r }
PROPOSITION 6.6:  Say that r is sufficiently low so that a self-enforcing implicit contract
exists that is better than the best spot governance relationship. Then it is always optimal to
marginally strengthen one of the parties' bargaining positions (while the other is held
constant), as long as both coefficients of the optimal implicit contract are below the first-best
level (a, b < 1), a transfer of ownership rights is expected to take place after an implicit
contract is broken and the bargaining positions under the spot governance mode are not
affected.
PROOF:  λ1, λ2 > 0 if both constraints are binding.  In (13a) use the expressions for λ1 and λ2,
that are found from ∂L / ∂a = 0 and ∂L / ∂b = 0, to find
∂L / ∂ϕi > 0    ⇔    (1-a) (a + 2b - ψi + 
r2
2)b(3 i −ϕ+ ) + (1-b) (a - ϕi + 
r2
)a(3 iϕ− ) > 0
The latter inequality is always satisfied when a, b < 1, since a > ϕi ≥ ½ and b > ψi ≥ ½.
Similar for ∂L / ∂ψi.  QED.
Strong bargaining positions are in general good for the implicit contract, since the temptation
to renege then is weak for a given implicit contract (as ϕi is close to a and ψi is close to b).
That means that there will be a tendency to choose the ownership structure under an implicit
contract with as strong bargaining positions as possible.  This tendency is also present under
spot governance, since the expected joint surplus, Ωs = ϕs + ψs - ½ (ϕs2 + ψs2), increases in ϕs
and ψs for the relevant range of these parameters.  These two results held together show that
the same ownership structure tends to maximise the expected joint surplus both under spot
governance and implicit contracting.  However, as propositions 6.4 and 6.5 indicate, an
implicit contract can also benefit from symmetry in the bargaining positions.  Hence, if
another ownership structure implies more symmetrical bargaining positions, it can be
optimal to choose that structure instead of the one that is optimal under spot governance.12
To illustrate how an implicit contract can benefit from symmetry, assume that the best
ownership structure in a spot governance mode is (ϕs, ψs) = (0.9, 0.6), so that Ωs = 0.915,
and set ε = ½.  A first-best implicit contract is then self-enforcing for a given set of (ϕi, ψi), if
the discount rate (r) is not higher than the values given in table 1.  Some boxes are left blank.
These combinations of ϕi and ψi are not relevant for the given value of Ωs, since if they were
available in the implicit contract mode, they would also be available as spot governance
structures yielding a higher Ωs.  Negative values indicate that the first-best implicit contract
is not self-enforcing even if the discount rate is zero.
                                                
12
 There is also a tendency to choose the same ownership structures for both governance modes if the implicit
contract can include a fixed transfer, but then more asymmetrical bargaining positions can support a better
implicit contract under some settings.
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0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
0.50    0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.20 -0.25 -0.31 -0.35
0.55    0.05 0.09 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.15 -0.20 -0.26 -0.32 -0.37
0.60    0.02 0.05 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.14 -0.20 -0.26
0.65    -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.04 -0.03
0.70    -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.14
0.75    -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03
0.80    -0.15 -0.15 -0.14
0.85    -0.20 -0.20 -0.20
0.90    -0.25 -0.26 -0.26
0.95    -0.31 -0.32
0.99    -0.35 -0.37
Table 1.
Observe that a one-sided weakening of a party’s bargaining position now can be good to
sustain a first-best contract, since it leads to more symmetrical bargaining positions.  This
may seem counter to proposition 6.6, but the reader should remember that the proposition
was valid only for a, b < 1.  It can be optimal to set one of the coefficients higher than one, if
the bargaining positions are very different (and the implicit contract is relatively close to
achieve first-best).  Then the inefficiencies due to over-investment are outweighed by the
strengthened incentives to invest for the manager with the weakest bargaining positions.
Over-investment is necessary to keep the implicit contract self-enforcing.  Weakening the
strongest bargaining position can then be good, since over-investment is reduced and at the
same time the other (under-investing) manager’s incentives can be strengthened.
Since technology is fixed, the two managers can only choose between five sets of (ϕi, ψi),
that correspond to the five ownership structures defined in section 2.  In the table I have
indicated five boxes with grey shading, so that the basic assumptions of section 3 with
respect to bargaining positions for the different ownership structures are satisfied (ϕT1 ≥ ϕNI
≥ ϕCO ≥ ϕT2 = ϕJO and ψT2 ≥ ψNI ≥ ψCO ≥ ψT1 = ψJO).  This example is summarised in table 2.
Ownership structure ϕi ψi Max r to sustain first-best
T1 0.90 0.60 -0.26
NI 0.75 0.65 -0.03
CO 0.65 0.60 0.05
T2 0.60 0.70 -0.01
JO 0.60 0.60 0.11
Table 2.
Say for instance that the discount rate is 0.08.  Then joint ownership (partnership) is optimal,
since that is the only structure where first-best can be sustained.  But if we change the
assumptions with respect to what bargaining positions that each ownership structure implies,
ϕi
ψi
T1
NI
CO
T2
JO
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the ranking can change.  Say that (ϕCO, ψCO) = (0.65, 0.65), while the other assumptions
remain the same.  Then cross ownership (mutual hostage taking) dominates the other
structures to achieve first-best.  Similarly, if (ϕNI, ψNI) = (0.70, 0.70), non-integration (a
relational contract) would be better.  In this way we can also change around the assumptions
so that type 1 or type 2 ownership (firm 1 and firm 2) would be optimal.
PROPOSITION 6.7:  The optimal ownership structure for the implicit contract mode can be
different from the optimal structure under spot governance.  No ownership structure can be
ruled out before the corresponding bargaining positions are known.
PROOF:  One can easily construct examples from table 1 that satisfy the assumptions with
respect to the relative bargaining positions of the different ownership structures, so that in
each example a different ownership structure is optimal under the implicit contract, while the
structure that is optimal under spot governance remains unchanged.  QED.
To sum up, the two managers should choose the same ownership structure under the implicit
contract as they would have done under spot governance, unless another ownership structure
with more symmetrical bargaining positions can support a better implicit contract. The
assumptions we have taken so far are in general not enough to rule out any of the ownership
structures as the optimal one under implicit contracting (while joint ownership and cross
ownership are dominated by non-integration under spot governance).
b) The choice of technology
Above I assumed that technology was given, so that only the choice of ownership structure
could influence the bargaining positions.  Now consider the situation where the managers
can choose between technologies.  For simplicity, assume that the managers choose the
ownership structure for the implicit contract that yields the highest expected joint surplus
also in the spot governance mode.  Then no transfer of ownership rights is expected after an
implicit contract violation (∆ = 0).  Focus on the interesting special case where the two
managers have equal bargaining positions in the first place.
PROPOSITION 6.8:  Suppose that the two managers have equal bargaining positions ϕ = ψ ≡ k.
Assume that the discount rate r is sufficiently low, so that a self-enforcing implicit contract
exists for that setting, but that first-best is not sustainable.  Then the expected joint surplus
can be increased through a weakening of one of the parties’ bargaining positions (while the
other is held constant), when a transfer of ownership rights is not expected to take place after
an implicit contract is broken.
PROOF:  Set ϕ ≡ ϕi = ϕs and ψ ≡ ψi = ψs.  If ϕ = ψ ≡ k, then a = b ≡ α (from the corollary to
proposition 6.2) and λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ in the Lagrangian for the optimisation problem (since
everything is symmetrical).  If  α < 1, both constraints must be binding, so that λ > 0.  ∂L/∂ϕ
and ∂L/∂ψ express the change in the maximum joint surplus for a one-sided strengthening of
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manager 1’s and manager 2’s bargaining positions respectively.  From (7) it can then be
shown that (when ϕ = ψ ≡ k)
∂
∂ϕ
∂
∂ψ
L L
 ,    <  0    ⇔    r  <  
1
2
− k
ε
From (4a) and (4b), we know that under these circumstances r ≤ (2 - α - k) / 4ε must hold for
the implicit contract to be self-enforcing.  The inequality on the right hand side is then
always satisfied, since k < α.  In other words, ∂L/∂ϕ < 0 and ∂L/∂ψ < 0 hold if the implicit
contract is self-enforcing, ϕ = ψ ≡ k and a = b < 1.  QED.
Note that the proposition is independent of whether the implicit contract can include a fixed
transfer or not.  Compare the result with proposition 6.6, when a weakening of bargaining
positions was bad, because the temptation to renege in a given period then increases.  Now
that effect is countered by an increase in the future losses associated with an implicit contract
violation, since the incentives under spot governance are weakened as well.  That was not the
case in proposition 6.6, where the expected joint surplus under spot governance (Ωs) was
held constant.
Proposition 6.8 shows that with the specific cost functions that I have assumed in this paper,
the net effect of a weakening of bargaining positions is positive if the parties have similar
bargaining positions to start with. That does no longer need to be the case if the managers
have very asymmetrical bargaining positions.13  Also note that the proposition is no longer
true if investments are very elastic with respect to the investment specificity parameters.14
Since the proposition holds only when no transfer of ownership rights is expected after an
implicit contract violation, the result is not relevant for the choice between ownership
structures.  But, if there are alternative technologies, then one with higher investment
specificity can generate a higher joint surplus.  Hence, I have shown that under some
circumstances stronger interdependencies can be good, even if such a technology does not
imply higher returns on investments.15
The fact that stronger interdependencies sometimes are good can also be illustrated with a
diagram that shows the highest value the discount rate can take for a first-best implicit
contract (without fixed transfers) to be self-enforcing, see figure 2 (where ε = ½ and ∆ = 0).
It can clearly be seen that a weakening of ϕ (ψ) is always good to sustain a first-best implicit
                                                
13
 When a, b < 1, ∂L / ∂ϕ < 0 and ∂L / ∂ψ < 0 will hold as long as |ϕ - ψ| (and hence |a - b|) is not too large.  The
critical value that |ϕ - ψ| can take decreases in ε (stronger temptation to renege), while it increases in r (more
weight on future losses).   Note that proposition 6.6 was more general in nature than proposition 6.8.
14
 Say that ci(ei) = 1/m eim.  Then proposition 6.8 is valid for all k ∈ [1/2, 1) and α > k when m ≥ 1.58 (m = 2 in
my model).  When investments are very elastic, the increased temptation to renege dominates the increased
punishment effect (Halonen 1994).
15
 Note that stronger interdependencies can be good also when asset transfers are expected after an implicit
contract violation, but only if investment specificities for the optimal ownership structure under spot governance
then increase, so that expected future losses associated with reneging become more important.
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contract if ϕ > ψ (ϕ < ψ).  And, when ϕ = ψ ≡ k, a smaller k can sustain a first-best contract
for higher discount rates. Observe that symmetrical bargaining positions are good to sustain
first-best (proposition 6.5), and that first-best is not always sustainable, even if the discount
rate is zero (proposition 6.4).  The absolute level of the discount rate in figure 2 is not very
interesting, since it depends crucially on the technology assumptions of the model (e.g. the
form of the cost function and the choice of ε).
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7. The choice of ownership structure under spot governance
As stated in section 6, the assumptions we have taken so far are not strong enough to rule out
any of the ownership structures in the implicit contract mode, and I do not think that such
(stronger) assumptions should be taken in a general theory of the firm.  However, some more
structure with respect to the investment specificity technology can be useful to illustrate
some of the results.  In this section I develop a model of the investment specificity
technology that allows us to compare the different ownership structures under spot
governance.  In the next section I use this model to construct an example with implicit
contracts.
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Figure 2.
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Assume a weak form of symmetry, in the sense that there is a linear relation between the
specificities of the two managers’ investments16
ϕT1 = 1 - ½Aη1 ψT1 = 1 - ½η2
ϕNI = 1 - ½AηNI ψNI = 1 - ½ηNI
ϕT2 = 1 - ½Aη2 ψT2 = 1 - ½η1
where 0 < η1 ≤ ηNI ≤ η2 ≤ 1, and A ∈ (0, 1/η2] can be interpreted as a measure of relative
investment specificity.17  η1 is used when a manager owns both assets, ηNI when she only
owns one asset and η2 when she does not own any asset at all.
Setting the expressions for ϕ and ψ into the expression for the expected joint surplus found
in section 3, it is straightforward to show that
(14) ΩT1  >  ΩT2     ⇔     A  >  1
(15) ΩT1  >  ΩNI     ⇔     (ηNI2 - η12)A2  >  η22 - ηNI2
(16) ΩT2  >  ΩNI     ⇔     ηNI2 - η12  >  (η22 - ηNI2)A2
Although outside the core of this paper (and not necessary for the example in the next
section), consider some interpretations and special cases of these three results.  First,
compare integration of type 1 and type 2.
DEFINITION 7.1:  Manager 1 has a higher (lower) investment specificity than manager 2 if
A > 1 (A < 1).
PROPOSITION 7.1:  If integration is optimal, the manager with the highest degree of invest-
ment specificity should own both assets in the spot governance mode.
PROOF:  The proposition follows directly from (14) and definition 7.1.  QED.
Second, compare integration and non-integration.
DEFINITION 7.2:  The two assets are strictly complementary if η2 = ηNI.
Then one asset is of no value if it cannot be used together with the other asset.
PROPOSITION 7.2:  If the assets are strictly complementary in nature, some type of integration
(weakly) dominates non-integration in the spot governance mode.
                                                
16
 Since cross ownership and joint ownership are dominated by non-integration in the spot governance mode,
those ownership structures are ignored in this section.
17
 The following results are insensitive to a positive linear transformation of the investment specificity
technology, in the sense that we could replace ηj with δηj, where j ∈ {1, NI, 2} and δ ∈ (0, 1/η2].
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PROOF:  If the assets are strictly complementary in nature, we can substitute ηNI for η2 in (15)
and (16), which then imply
ΩT1  ≥  ΩNI     ⇔     ηNI ≥ η1
ΩT2  ≥  ΩNI     ⇔     ηNI ≥ η1
The inequalities on the right hand side are by definition satisfied, hence T1 and T2 both
(weakly) dominate NI.  QED.
Finally, consider a situation where a manager is essential to an asset, so that the other
manager cannot gain from owning that asset (if the two managers do not cooperate).
DEFINITION 7.3:  A manager is essential for the asset most specific to her investments
if η1 = ηNI.
PROPOSITION 7.3:  Non-integration (weakly) dominates integration in the spot governance
mode, if both managers are essential with respect to the asset most specific to each manager.
PROOF:  If both managers are essential for the asset most specific to their own investments,
we can substitute ηNI for η1 in (15) and (16), which then imply
ΩT1  ≤  ΩNI     ⇔     η2 ≥ ηNI
ΩT2  ≤  ΩNI     ⇔     η2 ≥ ηNI
The inequalities on the right hand side are by definition satisfied, hence T1 and T2 are both
(weakly) dominated by NI.  QED.
In this section I have demonstrated that non-integration dominates integration in the spot
governance mode if each manager is essential to the use of her asset, while the opposite is
the case if the assets are strictly complementary in nature.  The manager with the highest
investment specificity will then own both the assets.
Since Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) have already provided us with excellent
insights on the choice of ownership structure in the spot governance mode, I have kept my
analysis in this section on a rather superficial level.  Note that proposition 7.2 is a variation
of proposition 6 in Hart and Moore (1990) and proposition 2(E) in Hart (1995 ch.2), while
proposition 7.3 corresponds to proposition 8 in Hart and Moore (1990) and proposition 2(D)
in Hart (1995 ch.2).
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8. An example
Assume the investment specificity technology of section 7.  Set η1 = 0.30,  ηNI = 0.38,
η2 = ηJO = 0.50 and ε = ½.  Manager 2's bargaining positions (i.e. her incentives) under the
different ownership structures are then fixed in the spot governance mode
ψT1 = ψJO = 0.75,   ψNI = 0.81   and   ψT2 = 0.85.
Since I have argued that implicit contracts are not likely to include fixed transfers, assume
that this is the case (i.e. t = 0 as in section 6).  The managers choose the governance structure
(ownership structure and governance mode) that maximises expected joint surplus.
Figure 3 shows how the optimal governance structure then is jointly determined by the
relative investment specificity (A) and the discount rate (r).
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                 Figure 3.
As stated in proposition 6.3, irrespective of investment technology, an implicit contract can
always be found that outperforms spot governance when the discount rate is sufficiently low
(i.e. the parties are sufficiently patient).  However, first-best is not always sustainable, even if
the discount rate goes to zero (proposition 6.4).
The two managers' bargaining positions are equal for three values of the relative investment
specificity parameter A:  A = η1/η2 = 3/5 (under T2), A = 1 (under NI, CO and JO) and
A = η2/η1 = 5/3 (under T1).  First-best can be achieved only if A is close to these values (and
the corresponding ownership structure is chosen).  Exactly equal bargaining positions are
superior with respect to how impatient the parties can be (proposition 6.5).
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For high discount rates, no self-enforcing implicit contract exists.  The indifference curves
between spot employment (I and II) and spot market are found from (15) and (16) in section
7.  The investment specificity technology is defined so that going from spot employment to
spot market, the positive effects of one manager’s strengthened incentives outweigh the
negative effects of the other manager’s weakened incentives when A is close to 1.  With more
asymmetrical technologies, so much can be gained by letting the manager with the highest
investment specificity own both assets, that spot employment dominates spot market.  Her
incentives to invest are then much more sensitive to transfers of ownership rights than the
incentives of the other manager.
For a given technological setting (here denoted by a specific A), the same ownership
structure tends to maximise the expected joint surplus under both spot governance and
implicit contracts, since strong bargaining positions are good under both governance modes
(proposition 6.6).  However, an ownership structure with more symmetrical bargaining
positions can under some settings sustain a better implicit contract, although the expected
joint surplus under spot governance does go down.  This is typically the case when the
optimal ownership structure under spot governance would have implied that one of the
managers had to be given incentives to over-invest in the corresponding implicit contract.
In the example, more symmetrical bargaining positions are obtained by choosing integration
for a larger range of A under implicit contracting than under spot governance.  With other
values of η1, η2 and ηNI it could be the other way around.  In fact, for sufficiently large ηNI,
non-integration would be dominated by integration under spot governance for all values of
A, while relational contracting still could dominate firms.
The indifference curve between spot governance and implicit contracts is influenced by the
overall level of efficiency loss due to relation- and asset-specificity.  The way the example is
constructed, the specificity of manager 1’s investments increases as A increases, while the
specificity of manager 2’s investments is constant.  In other words, the overall efficiency loss
in the spot governance mode increases going from left to right in the diagram.  The potential
gains of implicit contracts are then larger, and an implicit contract is self-enforcing for higher
discount rates (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1996).
Compare the three areas where first-best is possible.  Note that the area to the right (where
the overall efficiency loss is higher) is larger than the other two areas.  This illustrates the
same phenomenon that we saw in proposition 6.8 and figure 2.  Technologies with higher
interdependencies can be good, although the returns on investments remain the same.
Relational contracting dominates mutual hostage taking and partnerships for all (A, r) in this
example, due to the linear relation between the specificities of the two mangers’ investments.
However, partnerships become more interesting if there, for all practical purposes, is only
one asset to own.  That is often the case, either because the assets are very complementary in
nature, or because the asset is indivisible.  Then non-integration (and cross ownership) are
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not relevant.  In the spot governance mode, joint ownership will be dominated by spot
employment as before.  However, partnerships can dominate firms.  This is illustrated in
figure 4, where the assumptions otherwise are the same as in figure 3.18
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Settings where the two parties have similar technologies, they take a long-term perspective
and there is only one asset to own, are favourable to partnerships.  These conditions seem to
be satisfied for many law and management-consulting firms (where the only significant asset
is the company name), which indeed often are jointly owned by active partners.
Of course, the size of the area in figure 4 where partnership dominates firms depends on the
parameter setting.  Partnership will be the optimal structure under a larger range of (r, A), if
for instance η1 is reduced (while the other parameters remain the same), since the regions for
first-best under Firm I and Firm II then will be further away from A = 1.
9. Concluding remarks
The paper aims at developing a richer logical framework for discussing basic corporate
governance questions.  In my dynamic model, ownership structures such as joint ownership
(and cross ownership) can be justified based on rational (economic) reasoning, while in more
static models there is usually no room for such structures.
                                                
18
 η1 is now used when a manager owns the single asset, and η2 (= ηJO) is used when she does not own it.
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I show that ownership in general does matter also when the parties to some degree are
disciplined by reputation effects.  In fact, that can be the case even if the parties are infinitely
patient.  Although the same ownership structure tends to be optimal both under spot
governance and implicit contracts, another structure can be chosen if it leads to more equal
bargaining positions.  This can explain why long-term partners that otherwise seem very
similar, often also have symmetrical ownership rights.  Either they own a firm together on
equal terms (partnerships), or they work together on a long-term basis as two separate firms
(relational contracting).
The bargaining positions (resulting from the level of investment specificity) can be
influenced not only by the ownership structure but also by the initial choice of technology.
In some settings, the parties will benefit from increasing the technical interdependencies to
weaken the bargaining positions.  Note that such technology may also generate higher
expected returns, which normally is the main reason for introducing investment specific
technology in the first place.
To focus on the fundamental issues of investment specificity, I have used a very simple
modelling technology.  Still, I am able to develop more realistic predictions than Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (1996) with respect to firms versus relational contracting, since both
parties invest in my model.  The model is flexible in the sense that it is valid for any number
of assets, and it can easily be extended to more than two parties.  For instance, if there are
three parties, the renegotiation process can be defined so that each party gets 1/3 of the added
surplus, or one can use the Shapley value as solution concept (Hart and Moore 1990).  Note
that a manager in the model can be seen as a business unit or a large firm.
The model seems realistic in a bounded rationality perspective, since the structure of the
managerial decisions is quite simple.  In an implicit contract mode, they only have to choose
an ownership structure and agree upon a way to split the joint surplus according to how they
feel that each manager has contributed to the joint surplus.  However, if the implicit contract
was to include a fixed transfer, the managers would have to perform more conscious
calculations, since the fixed transfer can work only when it is agreed upon and understood
ex-ante.
To simplify the analysis, I let the joint surplus depend additively on the two managers’
investments, so that the implicit contract could be based on the value added of each manager.
Theoretically this is not very different from a situation where the implicit contract is based
on two other observable signals which depend on both the two managers’ efforts.  From a
more practical point of view, it is only important that the two managers are able to split the
joint surplus in a way that they both agree is fair in every period based on commonly
observed information.  Note that under spot governance (where no trust is needed) the two
managers do not need to split the joint surplus generated by cooperation, since only the total
joint surplus is used in the renegotiations.
- 30 -
ASSET OWNERSHIP AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS  V. 1.1 IVER BRAGELIEN   03.02.99
Like Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1996), I do only consider a quadratic cost function.  This
is of course a very special case.  On the other hand, most of the results seem robust with
respect to the form of the cost functions (and the benefit functions), as long as these are
symmetrical for the two managers.19  However, if one of the managers has higher or more
rapidly increasing marginal costs, then that would typically favour the other manager as asset
owner.
I have ignored the haggling costs associated with the different governance structures
(Williamson 1985).  One would expect these costs to depend on the relative bargaining
positions of the two parties.  It seems natural to believe that symmetrical bargaining positions
(as well as very extreme asymmetrical positions) are good for the haggling process, since
symmetry (in the negotiation outcome) is a powerful focal point (Schelling 1960).  If that is
the case, symmetrical bargaining positions can reduce both the hold-up problem (under
implicit contracts without fixed transfers) and the haggling costs.
This paper is of course only interesting if the hold-up problem as such is important for asset
ownership.  In my opinion, it must be relevant with respect to the build-up of capabilities and
firm resources, since such investments typically are firm specific in nature.  And judging by
the attention given to such aspects of the firm in recent strategy literature, the success of a
company depends to a very large degree on these investments.  However, ownership can also
be important for the information structure, the operational efficiency and the market position.
I have focused on asset ownership and a particular form of trust based on economic
arguments.  One could also imagine that explicit contracts could be used to reduce the hold-
up problem (see Bragelien 1998).  Other forms of authority based on contracts or social
mechanisms can also play important roles, and there are important aspects of trust (as social
mechanism) that are not captured in the model.
Despite the focus on asset ownership, the model can be used in a more general setting, where
other types of decision rights will influence the ex-post bargaining positions as well.  For
example, a manager or a unit can be given the right to decide on product modifications (or at
least a right to veto such changes), irrespective of asset ownership.  The more decision rights
there are to distribute, the more flexibility the parties have in finding a governance structure
with symmetrical bargaining positions that can support a good implicit contract.
                                                
19
 I have already repeatedly commented on the exception, proposition 6.8.
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Greek letters used in the paper:
γ -  gamma Investment specificity factor for manager 1
λ -  lambda Investment specificity factor for manager 2
ϕ -  cphi Ex-post bargaining position for manager 1
ψ -  psi Ex-post bargaining position for manager 2
θi -  theta Net value added by a manager i
Ω -  Omega Expected joint surplus for a period under spot governance
∆ -  Delta Discounted value added from a transfer of ownership rights
η -  eta Investment specificity parameter
